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1 Introduction 
In the last twenty years, scholars have scrutinized the electoral advantages conferred by 
incumbency-both at the federal and at the state level-more than perhaps any other fac­
tor affecting U .S. legislative elections.1 Much of the literature focuses on explaining why 
the incumbency advantage in U .S. House elections grew so substantially, starting in the 
mid-1960s. The dominant contenders in the literature are two, one emphasizing resources 
of various kinds (Mayhew 1974) and opportunities to perform constituency services (Fio­
rina 1977; 1989), one emphasizing partisan dealignment (Erikson 1972; Burnham 1974; 
Ferejohn 1977). While not incompatible, these explanations do point to significantly 
different factors as key, and neither has emerged as a clear winner. 
In this paper, we suggest a new approach to measuring the incumbency advantage , one 
that disaggregates the total value of incumbency into three components. By examining 
the trends over time in these three components we find evidence suggesting that much of 
the growth in the incumbency advantage at the federal level cannot be accounted for by 
resource growth; rather, some version of the dealignment story will have to be employed. 
A sketch of our logic is as follows. Incumbency confers valuable resources and media 
exposure, and these can be expected to have both a direct and an indirect effect on the 
vote. The direct effect arises because legislative resources (e.g., personal staff) can be 
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used in electorally useful ways (e.g., to perform casework) . The indirect effect arises 
because potential challengers, knowing that incumbents can derive large direct benefits 
from the resources at their disposal, will be less inclined to enter the fray-and this will 
be particularly true of potential challengers with higher opportunity costs, hence higher 
quality. That incumbents can scare off quality opponents seems to be generally appreci­
ated in the literature. What has been less clearly recognized is that how much this boosts 
the incumbency advantage depends on how much candidate quality matters in determin­
ing the vote. The incumbency advantage may have increased because incumbents had 
more resources and opportunities to perform constituency services (a direct effect) ; or be­
cause knowledge of these resources and opportunities scared off high-quality challengers 
(an indirect effect) ; or both. But even holding constant these factors, the incumbency 
advantage may also have increased if a given quality differential between candidates mat­
tered more to the final outcome. That such a "third" effect might have existed seems 
plausible from the extensive literature depicting the evolution of U.S. House elections 
from party-centered to candidate-centered contests. Yet none of the current methodolo­
gies for measuring the incumbency advantage separates the total incumbency advantage 
into direct, scare-off, and quality effects, so that one can assess the relative contribution 
over time of each component. 
This paper seeks to fill that gap. Our results show that most of the increase in the in­
cumbency advantage, at least down to 1980, came through increases in the quality effect. 
Thus, if one wants to explain the overtime development of the incumbency advantage 
in U.S. House elections, it is crucial to understand why having had previous electoral 
experience-our operational measure of candidate quality-became more and more impor­
tant in predicting vote shares. This is a different way of posing the explanatory task 
than is commonly encountered in the literature and it leads, as we shall show, to dif­
ferent conclusions regarding the relative importance of growing resources and partisan 
dealignment in explaining the growth of the incumbency advantage. 
The paper proceeds as follows. We first review the literatures on what caused the 
incumbency advantage to increase (section 1) and how best to measure this advantage 
(section 2). We then suggest improvements in both domains, elaborating a simple path­
analytic model of the incumbency advantage that isolates the direct and indirect effects 
in which we are interested (section 3). After discussing our operational model (section 4) , 
we give our results (section 5), discuss a theoretical point raised by those results (section 
6), and conclude (section 7). 
2 Causes of the Increase in the Incumbency Advan­
tage 
Shortly after the discovery in the 1970s that the value of incumbency had increased sub­
stantially beginning in the mid-1960s (Erikson 1972; Mayhew 1974), a cottage industry 
arose to explain the upward trend. There are now two main contenders in the literature. 
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One school of thought emphasizes the resources that incumbency confers: The frank­
ing privilege may be used to subsidize what are in essence campaign mailings; staff and 
office allowances may be used to provide various electorally valuable services to con­
stituents; committee positions may be used to help raise campaign funds; the House 
bank can be used in various creative ways; and so forth. Many of these resources in­
creased during the 1960s and 1970s, providing a plausible explanation for the increase of 
the incumbency advantage (Mayhew 1974). A variant on this line emphasizes the growth 
of the federal bureaucracy: more bureaucrats meant more red tape to be cut through by 
helpful, non-partisan, and competent representatives (disposing of more resources to do 
the cutting), hence more votes from grateful constituents (Fiorina 1977; 1989). 
The evidence for the resources/opportunities school is largely positive at the state 
level. Holbrook and Tidmarch (1991), in a study of thirty-two states, find that the sopho­
more surge (a downwardly-biased estimator of the incumbency advantage; see Gelman 
and King 1990) increases with allowances for staff and for trips back to the constituency. 
King (1991a), in a study of thirteen states, finds that the incumbency advantage is sta­
tistically related to the size of legislative operating budgets, measured on a per legislator 
basis. Cox and Morgenstern (1993; N.d.), in studies of twenty-four and forty states, 
respectively, find that the incumbency advantage increases with the size of legislative 
operating budgets, measured on a per constituent basis. Finally, Holbrook and Tid­
march (1993), in a study of thirty-nine states, find that margins of victory are higher for 
party leaders and chairs of standing committees, especially in states where these posts 
are endowed with special staff resources. 
At the federal level, the evidence for an incumbency advantage derived through the 
provision of constituency services is more mixed but still on balance positive. Fiorina 
(1989, pp. 85-90) notes that "between the 1950s and the 1970s personal staffs of members 
expanded and their constituency presence surged" and that this has led to "(l) a higher 
incidence of constituent and district services reported, (2) an increased tendency to eval­
uate representatives in terms of constituency attentiveness, and (3) a greater impact of 
constituency service evaluations on House voting." At the same time, Fiorina (p. 94) 
concedes that "scholars have failed to find a clear, direct link between constituency ser­
vice in each district and the corresponding electoral outcome." While some see this as a 
crucial fl.aw in the evidence, Fiorina (pp. 95-97) points to the crudity of the district-level 
variables available for analysis2 and the likely simultaneity bias in micro-level studies: 
members who perform more casework may do so precisely because they are electorally 
vulnerable, so that the zero-order correlation between casework and vote is attenuated 
(see also Rivers and Fiorina 1991 ) . 
The second major school of thought concerning the incumbency advantage holds that 
20ne study that has a particularly strong research design at the district-level is Cover and Serra 
(1989). They provide convincing evidence that constituents helped by caseworkers are more likely 
both to recognize the incumbent's name and to evaluate him or her favorably. Another recent and 
positive study is that of Alvarez and Schousen (1993), who find that larger flows of federal grants into a 
district improve the sitting member's name recognition, likes/dislikes ratio, and vote, especially among 
Democrats. Indirect evidence of the importance of resources is provided by Hart and Munger (1989) 
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it increased because of partisan dealignment in the electorate. Voters became less party­
oriented and more candidate-oriented. They weighed party affiliation less and informa­
tion about the personal characteristics of candidates - including their incumbency status 
- more in making their voting decisions. The earliest and most frequently encountered 
version of this argument suggested a simple substitution of an incumbency cue for a party 
cue: "Voters dissatisfied with party cues could [have reached for] other cues that [were] 
available in deciding how to vote. The incumbency cue [was] readily at hand" (Mayhew 
1974, p. 313). 
In principle, dealignment might have come about either through a distributional 
change in partisan affiliation within the electorate - e.g., through a decline in the pro­
portion of strong identifiers and an increase in the proportion of weak and independent­
leaning identifiers; or through a behavioral change, with voters in all categories of parti­
san identification putting less weight on the partisan affiliation of candidates, and more 
weight on their personal characteristics (Ferejohn 1977; Cover 1977; Krehbiel and Wright 
1983) . The latter idea, if one takes it seriously, suggests that voters have additively sep­
arable utility functions of the following form: U(c,p) = au(c) + (1 - a)v(p). Here, the 
total utility from a candidate with characteristics c and party affiliation p is expressed 
as a weighted average of an evaluation u( c) of the candidate's personal characteristics 
and an evaluation v(p) of the candidate's party, with a being the weight on personal 
characteristics (0 < a< 1). If voters put more weight on candidates' personal character­
istics, this would lead to an increased incumbency advantage on the assumptions that (1) 
incumbents either had always had superior personal characteristics, or developed such an 
advantage (via an increase in resources) in the 1960s; and (2) the average incumbent's 
"personal quality advantage" exceeded his or her "party differential advantage". 
It is not possible directly to observe the weights that voters place on partisan affiliation 
and personal characteristics. One can, however, observe the behavior of various categories 
of self-identified partisans. Using this approach, Cover (1977) and Krehbiel and Wright 
(1983) both find that changes in the distribution of voters across categories of partisan 
identification account for little of the change in reported vote. They conclude that there 
has been a more-or-less across-the-board change in a pro-incumbent direction. This 
change in behavior may reflect an across-the-board decrease in the weight placed on 
partisan affiliation; but it is also consistent with the various resource hypotheses: greater 
resources may have given incumbents greater advantages on the personal quality side of 
the ledger, without necessarily increasing the weight that voters put on that side. 
3 Measuring the Incumbency Advantage 
In this section, we consider the estimator proposed by Gelman and King ( 1990). They 
seek an estimate of the total effect of incumbency, including any scare-off and quality 
effects, by running the following regression for a given election t :  
(1) 
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Here, vj,t is the Democratic share of the two-party vote at election t; vj,t-l is the Demo­
cratic share of the two-party vote at election t - l;PJ,t equals 1 if the Democrats are 
the incumbent party (i.e., a Democratic candidate won at election t - 1) and -1 if the 
Republicans are the incumbent party; Ij,t equals 1 if there is a Democratic incumbent, 0 
if there are no incumbents, and -1 if there is a Republican incumbent seeking reelection 
in district j at election t (this definition ignores the possibility of two or more incumbents 
in a given district since redistricting years are excluded from the analysis); and u1J,t is 
an error term. 
The regression in equation (1) can be interpreted as follows. Suppose PJ,t equals 1 
(i.e., the Democrats are the incumbent party). The value of the OLS estimate will reflect 
a cross-sectional comparison between two subsets of the "PJ,t = 1" districts : those in 
which the winning Democratic candidate at time t-1 seeks reelection at time t (ht = 1), 
and those in which he or she does not (ht = 0). As the regression controls for Vj,t-I, 
one can think of the comparison as being between districts that are similar in terms of 
their normal vote,3 differing only in whether or not the incumbent sought reelection. 
The value of will thus reflect any direct benefits of incumbency in the form of resources 
that can be turned to electoral use. If the presence of an incumbent tends to scare off 
high-quality challengers, leaving the incumbent an easy contest against a patsy, whereas 
the absence of an incumbent brings forth strong, well-qualified competitors from both 
sides, then this too will be reflected in the value of . As noted above, Gelman and King 
seek to measure the overall impact of incumbency, not just the direct value of the pot of 
resources to which office-holders have access. 
Obviously, the cross-sectional comparison contrived by equation (1) would be mis­
leading if all the districts with incumbents this time were without incumbents last time, 
while all the districts without incumbents this time had incumbents last time. For then 
the lagged vote ( Vj,t-l) would not mean the same thing in the "with incumbent" an<l 
"without incumbent" districts: a Democrat getting, say, a 52% share of the vote when 
there is no incumbent says one thing about the normal vote in the district, getting the 
same share against an incumbent says something else. In particular, on the hypothesis 
that the incumbency advantage is positive, the normal vote will be higher in the latter 
than in the former district. In order to take account of possible diversity in the previous 
incumbency status of districts, Gelman and King note (pp. 1151-52) that one could 
simply add the lagged incumbency variable, ht-1, to equation (1)-and further that one 
ought to do so " if including [ht-l] had an effect on the estimates [of the coefficient of 
ht]·" Adding ht-l to the equation yields what we refer to as the full Gelman-King model: 
(2) 
Gelman and King find that the correlation between ht and IJ,t-l is in fact modest, 
when one controls for PJ,ti and accordingly opt for the simpler equation 2, at least when 
3The normal vote is defined as the expected vote in a district when short-term forces have a net 
impact of zero. It is intended to represent the long-term balance of partisan forces in a district. As we 
shall note below, exactly what one considers to fall in the category of short-term forces affects how one 
measures and interprets a normal vote 
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estimating incumbency in the U.S. House. 
A possible problem with Gelman and King's specification is as follows. Suppose that 
the vote received by a candidate can be broken down into components due to partisan 
factors, personal factors, and incumbency status. The Gelman-King specification controls 
for partisan factors in estimating the impact of incumbency status, but it does not control 
for candidate quality. If the same candidate(s) persist(s) runs in several consecutive 
elections, then candidate quality effects will influence both Vj,t-l and Vj,t· In particular, 
the quality of any incumbent candidate will constitute an excluded variable that affects 
both Vj,t-l and Vj,t· There will thus be a positive correlation between Vj,t-l and Uj,t· 
If this claim is true, then the Gelman-King estimator is biased. Even if one's goal is 
to provide an overall measure of the incumbency advantage, including the scare-off and 
quality effects, the OLS coefficient estimate from equation 1 or 2 may reflect the higher 
quality of incumbents as campaigners-something that inheres in themselves rather than 
in the office they hold. 
We cannot prove that there is a correlation between Vj,t-l and Uj,t· It is simply a 
suspicion on our part, based on a theoretical argument. If there is no such correlation, 
then the approach that we propose below will still differ in what it seeks to achieve-a 
decomposition of the total incumbency effect into direct and indirect components-but 
will not have any advantages from a purely econometric standpoint.4 
4 Causation and Measurement 
Conceptually, the vote-denominated incumbency advantage can be decomposed into two 
main parts-one direct, one indirect. What we shall call the direct value of incumbency 
derives from the electorally valuable resources of which incumbents dispose. The indirect 
value of incumbency arises because everyone knows that incumbents possess electorally 
valuable resources and this scares off high-opportunity cost challengers - which is typ­
ically to say better-qualified and more formidable challengers - leaving only patsies to 
take on most incumbents seeking reelection. 
The scare-off effect of incumbency does not operate only in the sense that incumbents 
are sometimes unopposed-in which case they have scared off any competition at all. It 
4Gelman and King explicitly defend their specification against several other possible objections. In 
particular, they consider the endogeneity of candidate entry: if incumbents decide whether or not to 
run for reelection (thus determining the value of Ij,t) partly on the basis of their forecasts of the vote 
(vj,t), then the OLS estimates of ht'S coefficient will be inconsistent. It should be noted, however, 
that forecasting House election results at the time entry decisions must be made (i.e., before the pri­
maries) is an inexact science at best, so one may well wonder if many incumbents receive a strong 
enough signal to nudge them from the field. Gelman and King consider those incumbents implicated in 
scandals-presumably a pretty strong signal - and find little to worry about. They conclude that "the 
complications entailed in making a correction [for endogenous entry] would be more trouble than it is 
likely to be worth" (p. 1152). We agree. 
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also operates in that the challengers who do come forth are weaker than might otherwise 
be the case.5 To see this, consider a simple rational entry model (a la Schlesinger 1966 
or Rohde 1979) in which N potential candidates must decide whether to challenge an 
incumbent in district j. Let Wj be the opportunity cost to the j'th potential challenger 
of competing for the seat (i.e., the value of the job currently held by that person, less 
expected retention costs). The expected value of trying for the seat is pjb c, where Pj 
is the probability of winning, b is the value of the seat, and c is the cost of running a 
campaign. 6 We assume that Pj is a function, among other things, of: the direct value 
of incumbency at time t, denoted by 7/Jt; the national partisan swing, denoted by Dt; the 
"quality" of the incumbent candidate; and the "quality" of the challenger. Quality in this 
context refers to anything about candidates that enable them to garner votes : can they 
kiss babies without being awkward, speak effectively in public, look good on TV, figure 
out the appropriate issue positions to take for their constituency, develop an effective 
"home style" (Fenno 1978), run an effective campaign (or hire a campaign manager who 
can), and so forth? Holding constant partisan factors, higher quality candidates will 
outperform lower quality candidates. 
A potential candidate will enter the fray only if pjb - c > Wj. Thus, if 7/Jt increases, 
Pj decreases, and high opportunity cost (typically also high quality) candidates will not 
enter. In words, if the electoral value of the pot of resources that incumbents enjoy in­
creases, then the probability that any given challenger will defeat a particular incumbent 
decreases, hence the expected benefit of challenging decreases, and hence only potential 
candidates with low opportunity costs will make a run at the seat. In particular, local and 
state office-holders in good positions, who would make the most formidable competitors 
for the incumbent, are less likely to challenge as 7/Jt increases. 7 
To measure the direct and indirect effects of incumbency separately one needs a 
model in which both incumbency status and candidate quality differentials are explicitly 
considered. We suggest a way of doing this in the next section. 
50ur distinction between a direct effect of incumbency, due to the resources of office being converted 
to electoral use, and an indirect effect of incumbency, due to anticipation of the value of those resources 
scaring off strong challengers, is thus distinct from that made by King (1991b) between a "contested­
election incumbency advantage" and a "scare-off effect,'' where the former means the advantage of 
incumbents given they face some opposition and the latter means the advantage of incumbents in scaring 
off any competition at all. In our terms, the contested-election incumbency advantage still embodies 
both a direct and an indirect or scare-off effect: not scaring off all competitors but scaring off high-quality 
competitors 
60ne might of course allow probability of victory and cost of campaigning to be functions of effort, 
but this (and other) refinements are unnecessary for present purposes 
7 Another refinement we ignore here is the possibility that b might increase with 'l/Jt, leaving the total 
change in expected benefit of challenging unclear. We consider this a second-order effect 
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5 An Estimator of the Incumbency Advantage 
In this section, we modify Gelman and King's equation 1 by adding explicit measures of 
the lagged and current Democratic quality advantages in each district. We first describe 
the operational measure of quality that we use, then present the equation to be estimated. 
Although quality in the sense that we have defined it is an elusive variable, there are 
some attempts to measure it in the literature. The simplest measure of the quality of a 
candidate is whether or not he or she has held a previous elective office, hence waged a 
successful campaign before. This variable has been used extensively in Jacobson's work 
(e.g., 1980, 1990a) . It codes a candidate as either of high quality (1 ) or of low quality 
(0) .8 
Using Jacobson's measure of candidate quality, the Democratic quality advantage in 
district j at time t can be operationalized by a variable DEA1QAj,t coded as follows : 
+ 1 if the Democratic candidate has previously held elective office while the Republican 
candidate has not; 0 if neither or both candidates have previously held elective office; 
-1  if the Republican candidate has previously held elective office while the Democratic 
candidate has not. In coding this variable it should be noted that incumbents are always 
of quality 1 because they have previously held elective office-their current office if none 
else. 
If we are going to add DEMQAj,t to the specification, then it also makes sense to 
add DEMQAj,t-l, for essentially the same reason that it makes sense to include Ij,t-i: 
If Vj,t-l is to proxy for the normal vote in the district, it should be controlled for both 
incumbency status and the Democratic quality advantage, since the normal vote is the 
expected vote for the Democrats given an open seat and no quality advantage for either 
side. 
Adding DEMQAj,t and DEMQAj,t-l to equation 2, one gets the following estimable 
equation: 
Estimating equation 3 by OLS for a single year will run afoul of the same criticism we 
made of Gelman and King's specification above. We can hope that including a proxy 
for the excluded quality variable will lessen the degree of autocorrelation in the error 
term, hence the degree of correlation between Vj,t-l and Ej,t, but it would be unrealistic 
to suppose that we have entirely got rid of the problem (if there was one to begin with ) . 
In any event, the parameters of interest are 'l/Jt and Bt: 'l/Jt will provide an estimate of the 
8 Another, more elaborate measure of candidate quality has been proposed by Krasno and Green (1988) . We have opted for the simpler measure, as it performs similarly to the more elaborate measure (see Jacobson 1990b ), is easier to interpret, and is available for many more years than is the Krasno-Green 
measure (which is available only for 1978 and - from Krasno 1994 - for 1988) . Unfortunately, because 
Krasno and Green did not measure quality in open seat contests, we cannot replicate our analyses on 
the 1978 data for which their measure is available: absent the open seat districts, we end up with a 
singularity in the data matrix. 
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direct effect of incumbency - the value of the pot of resources - Bt while will indicate 
how valuable having a quality advantage is to the Democrats. 
The full effect of incumbency can be derived as follows. First regress DE ]\If Q Aj,t 
on a vector of regressors including ht, in order to determine how much of the observed 
Democratic quality advantage is due to incumbency status. The coefficient on Ij,t in this 
regression, say 0-t, is one measure of the scare-off effect: how much the presence of an 
incumbent tends to deteriorate the quality of challengers. Multiplying this coefficient by 
Bt then converts this impact on quality into an impact on vote percentages. The overall 
effect of incumbency can thus be written in standard path-analytic fashion as �t + BtO-t. 9 
The particular model of DElVIQAj,t that we shall employ assumes that the Demo­
cratic quality advantage is sensitive to all predetermined variables that affect the Demo­
cratic vote, along with the lagged Democratic quality advantage. Thus, we have: 
where the equation is to be run separately for each year. The constant term lo cap­
tures any scare-off effect due to a net swing to the Democrats. The coefficient (}t gives 
the impact of incumbency status, holding previous Democratic vote share, party incum­
bency status, previous candidate incumbency status, and previous Democratic quality 
advantage constant.10 
6 Results 
The basic results from estimating the two equations specified above are given in summary 
form in Table 2 .  Our estimate of the total effect of incumbency (column 6) is very 
similar to Gelman and King's estimates (which are displayed in column 8).11 The average 
difference between the two sets of estimates is a little over half a percentage point. As can 
be seen in Figure 1, both estimates move in tandem over time (they correlate at 0. 99). 
The similarity of our estimates to those of Gelman and King suggests that, if there is a 
problem with the Gauss-Markov assumptions in the Gelman- King specification which 
9It should be noted that this estimate of the "total" effect of incumbency is conditional on there 
being a contested election. Another advantage of incumbency may be that incumbents scare off any 
competition at all. The current measure does not capture this component of the incumbency advantage. 
10We have also estimated DEMQA using an ordered probit (OP) approach. The OP and OLS results 
are very similar. For example, the correlation between the OLS estimate of the Democratic quality 
advantage in the i'th district and the OP estimate (calculated as the expected value:l · Pr(DEMQA = 
llXi) + 0 · Pr(DEMQA = OIXi) + -1 · Pr(DEMQA = -llXi) where Xi is the data vector for the ith 
district) 0.998. 
11The figures given in column 8 are those we get running Gelman and King's basic model on Gary 
Jacobson's data. As there are a few differences between Gelman and King's dataset and Jacobson's, 
these figures do not correspond exactly to Gelman and King's published numbers (which appear only in 
the form of a graph, Figure 2, on p. 1158). Our numbers, however, correlate at .97 with those given by 
Gelman and King (Figure 2). 
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our specification ameliorates, it is not a very large problem practically speaking - or, 
alternatively, our respecification does little to ameliorate it. 
An indication that the tripartite decomposition displayed in Table 2 is sensible is that 
the direct and scare-off effects are positively correlated (at +0.41) . If our story is correct, 
they should be: a larger direct effect, after all, reflects a larger pile of resources attached 
to congressional seats, which should be one factor (among many) that scares off quality 
challengers. So it is comforting to find that there is a properly-signed (and significant) 
correlation. 
The most striking features of our results are two. First, growth in the total incum­
bency advantage stems substantially, if not primarily, from growth in the indirect effect . 
Second, growth in the indirect effect stems primarily from growth in the quality effect. 
The relatively large growth rate of the indirect effect can be seen in column 7 of 
Table 2, which gives the percentage of the total incumbency advantage (direct plus 
indirect effects) that is accounted for by the indirect effect. These numbers, graphed 
in Figure 2, show an average upward trend from 1950 to 1990 of 0.41 percentage points 
per year (the standard error on this slope is 0.17, so it is statistically discernible from 
zero at conventional levels of significance) . Whereas the indirect effect constituted only 
9.5% of the total incumbency effect in 1950, it constituted 28.2% in 1990. 
Another way to show the importance of growth in the indirect effect is to compute 
the average rate of growth in both effects - indirect and direct - over various time 
periods, and compare them. We take four different starting points before the "big jump" 
in 1966 - viz., 1956, 1958, 1960 and 1964 - and calculate average growth rates over the 
succeeding twenty years. As can be seen in panel A of Table 3, growth in the direct effect 
is never statistically discernible from zero, whereas growth in the indirect effect always 
is. Taking the point estimates of the rate of growth for both effects at face value, growth 
in the indirect effect accounts for somewhere between 42% and 116% of total growth in 
the incumbency advantage over the four twenty-year periods examined. 
If the indirect effect was growing as fast or faster than the direct effect from the 
mid-1950s to the mid-1980s, what was driving it? The answer is apparent from Figure 3, 
which plots the scare-off effect, quality effect, and their product (the indirect effect) all 
together. As can be seen, the scare-off effect appears to increase little, and that erratically, 
whereas the quality effect more than doubles from 1968 to 1976, fluctuating substantially 
thereafter but around a higher mean than previously observed . Visual impressions are 
corroborated by some simple regressions against time (see panel B of Table 3). Over the 
period from 1960 to 1980, for example, a regression of the scare-off effect on time yields 
a virtually nil negative coefficient, whereas a similar regression of the quality effect on 
time yields a positive and significant coefficient of +0.19. Virtually all of the systematic 
increase in the indirect effect, at least in the four twenty-year periods examined from the 
mid-1950s to the mid-1980s, is due to increases in the quality effect. 
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7 Quality Counts 
If one wants to explain why the incumbency advantage grew from the mid-1960s on -
which is the usual puzzle posed in the literature - our figures show that one must be 
primarily interested in explaining why the quality advantage grew. Over the period from 
1960 to 1980, a regression of the direct effect on time yields a virtually zero (actually 
negative) slope, as does a regression of the scare-off effect on time. The only component 
of the incumbency advantage that exhibits systematic growth over this time period is 
the quality effect. While it is true that different time periods do not yield such stark 
results, the basic point is not altered regardless of the time period chosen: the bulk of 
the systematic change appears due to increases in the quality effect.12 
So how does one explain the increase in the quality effect? There are two main pos­
sibilities upon which we shall focus. First, there may have been a decline in partisanship 
within the electorate. This would have meant that the personal characteristics of candi­
dates mattered more. That a candidate had held office previously (was of "high quality" ) 
would then be a cue that he or she was not entirely unlovely, having been able to win 
election at least once before. It may be that the difference in quality between those who 
had and had not held previous office did not change over the postwar era, and that the 
entire effect is due to voters' putting more weight on a quality differential that had always 
existed. But if in fact voters were putting more weight on candidate quality, then the 
value of the cue should have increased too: those candidates who had previously held 
some office were more likely to have good personal characteristics, because it was more 
necessary that they have them in order to win whatever office they held (cf. Payne 1980). 
A second possible explanation of the growth in the quality effect has to do with 
managing campaigns. Those who had held previous office had overseen at least one 
election campaign before. In the 1950s, a candidate might have been able to rely on the 
local party organization to run his or her campaign. Thus, executive abilities were not 
required and previous campaigning experience may have mattered little. By the 1970s, 
however, a candidate had to put together his or her own organization, and exec utive 
abilities were at a premium (see, e.g., Fowler 1993, p. 76; Stewart 1989) . The holding of 
previous office, by this story, signalled someone who could raise money, design or oversee 
the design of a campaign strategy, hire and fire as needed, and so on. As campaigning 
became more and more involved and expensive, high-quality candidates became stronger 
and stronger relative to inexperienced candidates (who could no longer rely on the local 
party to pull them through to a respectable showing) . 
12It has been suggested to us that a linear time trend may not be what one should look for. Rather, 
the data may show a pre-1964 plateau, a steep increase 1964-72, and another plateau after 1972 (cf. 
Aldrich and Niemi N.d.). We have run regressions allowing for breaks (in the constant term only, in 
the slope only, in both) in the sixties, and also plotted robust lowess regression lines (cf. Cleveland 
1979), without finding any stronger evidence that the direct effect was of primary importance. Indeed, 
if there is a mid-sixties structural break in any of the data series, it is in the quality effect or indirect 
effect series-as is suggested by Figure 3. Thus, whether one looks at linear trends only, or allows also 
for structural breaks in the time series, growth in the indirect effect seems to account for the bulk of the 
growth in the overall incumbency advantage 
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A corollary to this story would be the pattern of increasing volatility in House elections 
noted by Jacobson (1987). When incumbents faced inexperienced challengers, their vote 
margins were increasingly large from the mid-1960s on. When they faced experienced 
challengers, however, they were still in for a real fight. Thus , the average margin for 
incumbents increased, but so did the standard deviation of their vote swings, leaving 
them little more secure than before. More and more, elections turned on whether the 
incumbent could scare off a quality challenger. The inexperienced could no longer make 
a good showing, absent the help of a strong local party organization. 
Finally, we should note something that does not appear to explain the growth in 
the quality effect: resources. Growth in the resources attached to office should push the 
coefficient on incumbency status (the direct effect) up, and thereby boost the scare-off 
effect of holding office. There is no theoretical reason, however, to suppose that it would 
increase the quality effect . The coefficient on the Democratic quality advantage should 
reflect the value of running an experienced against an inexperienced candidate, holding 
incumbency status (and thereby the pot of resources attached to incumbency) constant. 
There may be some artifactual reasons to suspect that a growth in resources may have 
pushed the quality effect up. For example, consider the following four subsets of districts: 
those in which DEMQAj,t = 1 and ht = 1 (Dll), those in which DEJ\!f QAj,t = 0 and 
ht = 1 (DOl), those in which DEf\!fQAj,t = 1 and ht = 0 (DlO), and those in which 
DEMQAj,t = ht = 0 (DOO). The coefficient on the Democratic quality advantage 
reflects a comparison between districts Dll and DOl, and between districts DOl and 
DOO. Suppose that the percent of districts falling in the Dll and DOl categories (both 
incumbent-defended) increased secularly over time and that the quality advantage was 
larger in incumbent-defended seats. Then the change in the composition of districts would 
lead to a perceived increase in the quality effect. Alternatively, perhaps the quality effect 
in incumbent-held but not in open seats increased. Either story would suggest that 
resources may have had something to do with boosting the quality effect. 
As it turns out, there is no substantial increase in the proportion of incumbent-held 
versus open seats over the postwar period (recall that only uncontested races make it 
into the data set). Nor is it the case that the quality effect is larger in incumbent-held 
districts: indeed, in the modal year the quality effect is larger in open seats than in held 
seats. Thus, whatever else can be said about our results, they appear to say that the 
bulk of the increase in the U.S .  House incumbency advantage must be chalked up to 
partisan dealignment of one kind or another, rather than to a growth in resources and 
constituency service. 
How plausible are the particular stories of partisan dealignment that we have told? 
Can either explain the over-time trends in the size of the quality effect-and in particular 
the substantial jump in the quality effect between 1970 and 1974 (or 1968 and 1976)? 
A full defense of the general plausibility of the dealignment hypotheses is beyond the 
scope of this paper. There is a large literature to which Wattenberg (1984) and Jacobson 
(1990a) provide introductions. 
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A more specific defense of the plausibility of the dealignment hypotheses, in terms 
of the overtime trend in the quality effect, is necessarily rather speculative. We note 
one possibility, similar to Tufte's (1974) redistricting hypothesis. It is not that the wave 
of redistricting sparked by the Supreme Court's decisions in Baker v. Carr (1962 ) and 
Wesberry v. Sanders (1964) advantaged incumbents, it is that it may have discombob­
ulated established local party organizations. Much of the congressional redistricting in 
the 1960s occurs in 1966 and 1968, in response to Wesberry v. Sanders. By previous 
standards, the quality effect is large in 1966 and 1968, and it continues to grow thereafter, 
reaching new highs in 1970, 1974, 1976, and 1978. Perhaps the partial redistrictings in 
1966 and 1968, along with the full redistricting in 1972, opened up new political niches in 
the new districts, making the old party organizations less relevant and each candidate's 
campaigning skills more relevant. 
A smidgen of evidence in favor of the idea that redistricting may have accelerated 
the personalization of campaigns, thus widening the performance differential between 
experienced and inexperienced candidates, is the following. If one splits the 1968 sample 
into two groups-those districts which were and were not redistricted in 1966-and runs 
the regression specified in equation (3) on both subsamples separately, one finds that 
the quality effect is over twice as large in the redrawn as in the unchanged districts. 
Similarly, if one splits the 1970 sample into two groups-districts which were redrawn 
in either 1966 or 1968, and districts which were not-and runs equation (3), one finds a 
quality effect of essentially zero in the unchanged districts, a quality effect of 3. 73 in the 
redrawn districts. Perhaps there is something worth looking at here, rather subtler than 
the mechanism suggested in Tufte's original hypothesis. 
8 Conclusion 
In this paper, we have argued that the vote-denominated incumbency advantage can be 
decomposed conceptually into a direct and an indirect effect. The direct effect reflects 
the value of the resources attached to legislative office, such as personal staff, the franking 
privilege, and so on. The indirect effect is the product of a scare-off effect - the ability 
of incumbents to scare off high-quality challengers-and a quality effect - reflecting how 
much electoral advantage a party accrues when it has an experienced rather than an 
inexperienced candidate. 
Using a simple two-equation model, we estimate the size of the direct, scare-off, and 
quality effects for postwar U.S. House elections (1946-1990), finding that the bulk of the 
increase in the overall incumbency advantage, at least down to 1980, can be traced to 
increases in the quality effect. This brings us to an important conclusion: the task for 
those wishing to explain the growth in the vote-denominated incumbency advantage down 
to 1980 is to explain why the quality advantage grew - why having an experienced as 
opposed to an inexperienced candidate became more and more important in determining 
a party's vote share. 
13 
We think the most plausible explanation of why the quality advantage increased when 
it did - rather abruptly in the 1968-1976 period - has to do with a restructuring of 
the organizational bases of U.S. House campaigns. In broad brush strokes, the story is 
this: before the wave of court-mandated redistrictings in the 1960s, many House dis­
tricts had changed little over the previous generation or so. Candidates running in these 
districts often found stable and relatively influential party organizations that could run 
a campaign. Thus, for the most part, party organizations-rather than candidate or­
ganizations - structured campaigns. After the redistrictings of the 1960s, however -
which, in order to eradicate what were sometimes enormous levels of malapportionment, 
had to completely redraw district lines - the old party organizations were no longer as 
well-adapted to the available electoral niches. Candidates who could step in and build 
their own campaign organization, sometimes no doubt combining old party resources in 
new ways, had an advantage over those who simply relied on "the party." Thus, rather 
abruptly, the value to a party of having an experienced candidate grew. This increased 
value of experience led in turn to an increased value of incumbency: not only were in­
cumbents by definition experienced themselves but also their presence could scare off 
experienced challengers from the other party. When experience meant little, these con­
siderations contributed little to the incumbency advantage; but when experience became 
more important, the value of incumbency grew accordingly. 
Regardless of what one thinks of the particular explanation we have offered of why 
the quality effect grew (which stresses a restructuring of the organizational bases of 
American campaigns) , or indeed what one thinks of the particular explanation we have 
offered of why campaign organizations became more candidate-centered ( which stresses 
the effects of redistricting) , we do think a final point bears emphasis. If we are correct in 
saying that most of the growth in the incumbency advantage 1964-1972 is due to a fairly 
abrupt increase in the quality effect, rather than to an (abrupt) increase in the direct 
effect, then this suggests that one should look less to explanations based on increasing 
resources, or opportunities to perform constituency services, and more to events (such as 
redistricting) capable of explaining shifts in the importance of the campaigning skills of 
individual candidates. 
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Table 1: Decompostion of Incumbemcy Advantage in U.S . House Election, 1946-1990 
Scare Total Percent GK 
Direct Quality Off Indirect Total Indirect Total 
Year Effect Effect Effect Effect Effect of Total Effect 
1946 -1.22 0.53 2.24 1.19 -0.03 -0.49 
(0.64) (0.05) (0.67) 
1948 -0.54 0.51 2.12 1.08 0.54 0.55 
(1.25) (0.11) (0.65) 
1950 1.52 0.07 2.28 0.16 1.68 9.5 1.33 
(1.03) (0.09) (0.66) 
1954 -0.05 0.36 1.82 0.66 0.61 1.96 
(0.91) (0.09) (0.56) 
1956 2.25 0.31 0.78 0.24 2.49 9.6 2.46 
(0.94) (0.10) (0.61) 
1958 2.26 0.38 1.99 0.76 3.02 25.2 3.09 
(0.94) (0.09) (0.56) 
1960 5.69 0.47 1.15 0.54 6.23 8.7 5.32 
(1.02) (0.04) (0.63) 
1964 3.51 0.21 1.10 0.23 3.74 6.2 3.92 
(1.15) (0.09) (0.79) 
1966 11.79 0.63 2.25 1.42 13.11 10.8 11.92 
(1.66) (0.11) (1.01) 
1968 2.91 0.26 2.28 0.59 3.50 16.9 4.55 
(1.81) (0.15) (0.88) 
1970 6.86 0.57 2.61 1.49 8.35 17.8 8.08 
(1.06) (0.08) (0.74) 
1974 3.06 0.51 4.13 2.11 5.17 40.8 5.94 
(1.21) . (0.07) (0.92) 
1976 6.23 0.40 5.12 2.05 8.28 24.8 8.20 
(1.22) (0.08) (0.83) 
1978 7.76 0.35 5.37 1.88 9.64 19.5 8.90 
(1.30) (0.07) (1.06) 
1980 5.08 0.43 3.06 1.32 6.40 20.6 7.26 
(1.44) (0.08) (1.01) 
1984 7.76 0.38 7.76 2.95 10.71 27.5 9.29 
(1.68) (0.10) (1.04) 
1986 9.24 0.53 5.41 2.87 12.11 23.7 12.27 
(1.27) (0.08) (0.86) 
1988 9.11 0.64 2.69 1.72 10.83 15.9 11.11 
(1.56) (0.10) (0.88) 
1990 6.08 0.73 3.28 2.39 8.47 28.2 8.13 
(1.45) (0.07) (1.08) 
Notes: Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 2: Decompostion of Incumbemcy Advantage in U . S .  House Election, 1946-1990 
Scare Total Percent GK 
Direct Quality Off Indirect Total Indirect Total 
Year Effect Effect Effect Effect Effect of Total Effect 
1946 -1.22 0.53 2.24 1.19 -0.03 -0.49 
(0.64) (0.05) (0.67) 
1948 -0.54 0.51 2.12 1.08 0.54 0.55 
(1.25) (0.11) (0.65) 
1950 1.52 0.07 2.28 0.16 1.68 9.5 1.33 
(1.03) (0.09) (0.66) 
1954 -0.05 0.36 1.82 0.66 0.61 1.96 
(0.91) (0.09) (0.56) 
1956 2.25 0.31 0.78 0.24 2.49 9.6 2.46 
(0.94) (0.10) (0.61) 
1958 2.26 0.38 1.99 0.76 3.02 25.2 3.09 
(0.94) (0.09) (0.56) 
1960 5.69 0.47 1.15 0.54 6.23 8.7 5.32 
(1.02) (0.04) (0.63) 
1964 3.51 0.21 1.10 0.23 3.74 6.2 3.92 
(1.15) (0.09) (0. 79) 
1966 11.79 0.63 2.25 1.42 13.11 10.8 11.92 
(1.66) (0.11) (1.01) 
1968 2.91 0.26 2.28 0.59 3.50 16.9 4.55 
(1.81) (0.15) (0.88) 
1970 6.86 0.57 2.61 1.49 8.35 17.8 8.08 
(1.06) (0.08) (0.74) 
1974 3.06 0.51 4.13 2.11 5.17 40.8 5.94 
(1.21) (0.07) (0.92) 
1976 6.23 0.40 5.12 2.05 8.28 24.8 8.20 
(1.22) (0.08) (0.83) 
1978 7.76 0.35 5.37 1.88 9.64 19.5 8.90 
(1.30) (0.07) (1.06) 
1980 5.08 0.43 3.06 1.32 6.40 20.6 7.26 
(1.44) (0.08) (1.01) 
1984 7.76 0.38 7.76 2.95 10.71 27.5 9.29 
(1.68) (0.10) (1.04) 
1986 9.24 0.53 5.41 2.87 12.11 23.7 12.27 
(1.27) (0.08) (0.86) 
1988 9.11 0.64 2.69 1.72 10.83 15.9 11.11 
(1.56) (0.10) (0.88) 
1990 6.08 0.73 3.28 2.39 8.47 28.2 8.13 
(1.45) (0.07) (1.08) 
Notes: Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
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Direct Effect 
Indirect Effect 
Scare-off Effect 
Quality Effect 
Indirect Growth as 
% of Total 
0.12 
0.09* 
0.01 
0.18* 
42.0% 
0.11 
0.08* 
0.00 
0.21 * 
42.0% 
-0.01 
0.07* 
-0.00 
0.19* 
116.0% 
0.26* 
71.0% 
Note: The first four entries give estimated slope coeficents from 
a regression of the various effects on a constant and a time trend. 
For example, over the 1956-1976 period, the direct effec grew at an 
average rate of 0.12 percentage points per year. Coeffients marked 
with an astrisk are significant at the 0.01 level . 
Figure 1: Two Estimates of Total Incumbency Advantage in U . S .  House Elections 
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Figure 3: The Scare-off, Quality, and Indirect Effects 
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